An incomplete model of English auctions with symmetric independent private values, similar to the one studied in Haile and Tamer (2003) , is shown to fall in the class of Generalized Instrumental Variable Models introduced in Chesher and Rosen (2014). A characterization of the sharp identi…ed set for the distribution of valuations is thereby obtained and shown to re…ne the bounds available until now.
Introduction
The path breaking paper Haile and Tamer (2003) One innovation in the paper was the use of an incomplete model based on weak plausible restrictions on bidder behaviour, namely that a bidder never bids more than her valuation and never allows an opponent to win at a price she is willing to beat. An advantage of an incomplete model is that it does not require speci…cation of the mechanism relating bids to valuations.
Results obtained using the incomplete model are robust to misspeci…cation of such a mechanism. The incomplete model may be a better basis for empirical work than the button auction model of Milgrom and Weber (1982) sometimes used to approximate the process delivering bids in an English open outcry auction.
On the down side the incomplete model is partially, not point, identifying for the primitive of interest, namely the common conditional probability distribution of valuations given auction characteristics. HT derives bounds on this distribution and shows how to use these to make inferences about the distribution and about interesting features that are functionals of the distribution such as the optimal reserve price.
The question of the sharpness of those bounds was left open in HT.
In this paper we resolve this question. We consider a slightly simpli…ed version of the model in HT and show that the model falls in the class of Generalized Instrumental Variable (GIV) models introduced in Chesher and Rosen (2014), (CR) . We obtain a characterization of the sharp identi…ed set for the auction model by applying the general characterization for GIV models given in CR. We show that there are bounds additional to those given in HT and in numerical calculations demonstrate that they can be binding.
The characterization of the sharp identi…ed set of valuation distributions comprises a dense system of in…nitely many inequalities restricting not just the value of the distribution function via pointwise bounds on its level but also restricting its shape as it passes between the pointwise bounds.
The restrictions of the model are set out in Section 2. In Section 3 GIV models are introduced and the auction model is placed in the GIV context.
The sharp identi…ed set for the auction model is characterized in Section 4 and the inequalities that feature in this characterization are explored in Section 5. A numerical example is presented in Section 6 and calculation of approximations to identi…ed sets of parameters in a parametric model is given in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
Model
This section sets out the restrictions of the auction model.
We study open outcry English ascending auctions with a …nite number of bidders, M , which may vary from auction to auction. The model is a slight simpli…cation of the model studied in HT in that there is no reserve price and the minimum bid increment is zero. These conditions simplify the exposition and are easily relaxed. 1 The …nal bid made by each bidder is observed. Each auction is associated with a value, z, of an observable variable Z. In some applications the number of bidders, M , could be an element of Z.
The mth largest value in an M element list of numbers x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x M ) or random variables X = (X 1 ; : : : ; X M ) will be denoted by Restriction 3. In an auction for which Z = z the valuations of bidders are identically and independently continuously distributed with conditional distribution function given Z = z denoted by F z ( ). In similar manner to HT, our identi…cation analysis is based on the restrictions (1) and (2) on bid and valuation order statistics. which will be singleton for all u and z in complete models but not otherwise.
Generalized Instrumental Variable models
GIV models place restrictions on such structural functions and also on a collection of conditional distributions G U jZ fG U jZ ( jz) : z 2 R Z g whose elements are conditional distributions of U given Z = z obtained as z varies across the support of Z. G U jZ (Sjz) denotes the probability that U 2 S conditional on Z = z under the law G U jZ .
In the context of the auction model the observed endogenous variables, and so forth. 3 Independence of the components ofŨ implies that the joint 2 To simplify notation plain subscripts "m" rather than order statistic subscripts "m : M " are used for the elements of Y , and shortly, U . 3Ũ is to be understood to reside on the common probability space ( ; F ; P) without distribution of U is uniform with constant density on its support R U , which
The M valuations can be written as functions ofŨ , thus
where F 1 z ( ) is the inverse function of F z . This is the quantile function of the valuation distribution. Since F 1 z is strictly increasing the ordering ofŨ is the same as the ordering of V so the order statistics of the M valuations are related to the uniform order statistics, U , as follows.
The restrictions (1) and (2) of Lemma 1 can be written as
and, on applying the increasing function F z ( ), they are as follows.
A GIV structural function which expresses these restrictions is as follows.
The restrictions of the auction model on the distribution of (U; Z) are:
(i) U and Z are independently distributed and (ii) the distribution of U , denoted G U , is the joint distribution of the order statistics of M independent uniform variates. This is uniform on the part of the unit M -cube in which
loss of generality. 4 See Section 2.2 in David and Nagaraja (2003) . The support of the order statistics U in the unit M -cube has volume 1=M ! so the constant value of the density is M !. For a given value of z this set comprises the values of u that can give rise to a particular value y of Y .
In some econometric models this set is a singleton -the classical linear model is a leading example. There are many econometric models in which Ulevel sets are not singleton. Examples include models for discrete outcomes and models with more sources of heterogeneity than endogenous outcomes.
In the auction model the U -level sets are:
it being understood that for all m, u m u m 1 . These are not singleton sets. Figure 1 illustrates for the 2 bidder case. 5 The U -level set U ((y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ); z; h) is the blue rectangle below the 45 line.
Applying Theorem 4 of CR, for each z 2 R Z , the identi…ed set of valuation distribution functions comprises the set of distribution functions F z ( ) such that for all sets S in a collection of test sets Q(h; z) the following inequality is satis…ed.
The collection of test sets Q(h; z) is de…ned in Theorem 3 of CR. It comprises certain unions of the members of the collection of U -level sets U(y; z; h) obtained as y takes values in the conditional support of Y given Z = z. 6
Given a test set S the probability mass G U (S) on the left hand side of (5) is calculated as M ! times the volume of the set S. 7
The set U(Y; Z; h) in (5) is a random set (Molchanov (2005) ) whose realizations are U -level sets as set out in (4). Its conditional probability distribution given Z = z is determined by the probability distribution of Y given Z = z: In the auction setting this is the conditional distribution of ordered …nal bids in auctions with Z = z. The probability on the right hand side of (5) is a conditional containment functional. It is equal to the conditional probability given Z = z that Y lies in the set A(S; z; h) where A(S; z; h) fy : U(y; z; h) Sg:
it being understood that for all m, y m y m 1 .
Figures 2 and 3 show that the e¤ect of changing the value y 0 M (which produces the magenta colored rectangles in these Figures) is to produce a new level set that is not a subset of U(y 0 ; z; h), hence the equality in (6). Figure 4 shows that the e¤ect of increasing the value y 0 M 1 is to produce a new level set that is a subset of U(y 0 ; z; h), hence the weak inequalities in (6).
If Y is continuously distributed the equality in (6) causes the probability
U(y 0 ; z; h)jZ = z] to be zero and the inequality (5) does not deliver an informative bound when S = U(y 0 ; z; h). So, when bids are continuously distributed, amongst the unions of U -level sets in a collection 6 In general the collection Q(h; z) contains all sets that can be constructed as unions of sets, (4), on the support of the random set U (Y; Z; h). In particular models some unions can be neglected because the inequalities they deliver are satis…ed if inequalities associated with other unions are satis…ed. There is more detail and discussion in CR14. 7 This is so because the joint distribution of the uniform order statistics is uniform on the part of the unit M -cube in which u1 u2 uM , with density equal to M !.
Q(h; z), nontrivial bounds are only delivered by unions of a collection of level sets whose members have values of the maximum bid Y M ranging over a set of values of nonzero measure.
We proceed to consider particular unions of this sort, as follows.
The region in R U occupied by such a contiguous union is
it being understood that, for all m, u m u m 1 . Figure 5 illustrates for the 2 bidder case. The contiguous union is the region under the 45 line outlined in blue -a rectangle with its top left hand corner removed.
The probability mass placed on this region by the distribution of the uniform order statistics is:
The set of values of Y that deliver U -level sets that are subsets of
it being understood that y 1 y M . This region is indicated by the shaded area in Figure 5 . 9 The conditional containment functional on the 8 A simple U -level set as in (4) is obtained on setting y 0 M = y 00 M . When YM is not continuously distributed this member of Q(h; z) may deliver nontrivial bounds. 9 The shaded area shows values of Fz(y1) and Fz(y2) that give rise to U -level sets that right hand side of (5) is calculated as follows.
This is a probability that can be estimated using data on values of ordered bids while the probability G U (U(y 0 ; y 00 M ; z; h)) is determined entirely by the chosen values of y 0 , y 00 M , z and the distribution function of valuations, F z , whose membership of the identi…ed set is under consideration.
For any choice of F z a list of values of (y 0 ; y 00 M ) delivers a list of inequalities on calculating (5) and if one or more of the inequalities is violated the candidate valuation distribution F z is outside the identi…ed set.
The inequalities that arise for particular choices of (y 0 ; y 00 M ) are now explored. The …rst choices to be considered deliver the inequalities in HT, then other choices are considered which deliver additional inequalities. 
are subsets of U(y 0 ; y 00 M ; z; h).
the probability mass placed by the distribution G U on the contiguous union, (7), is
and so the condition (5) delivers the following inequalities. 10 8n; 8v :
These inequalities hold for a valuation distribution function F z if and only if under that distribution there is the stochastic ordering of order statistics of bids and valuations required by the restriction (1).
The marginal distribution of the nth order statistic of M identically and independently distributed uniform variates is Beta(n; M + 1 n). 11 Let Q(p; n; M ) denote the associated quantile function. The restrictions placed on valuation distributions by the inequality (5) and the test sets under consideration in this Section are, written in terms of uniform order statistics:
which can be written as follows.
8v :
This continuum of pointwise upper bounds must hold for all valuation distribution functions in the identi…ed set. This is the bound given in Theorem 1 of HT. Figures 6 and 7 show the contiguous unions of U -level sets (the regions bordered in blue) delivering these inequalities for 2 bidder auctions. The regions shaded blue indicate the values of (F z (y 2 ); F z (y 1 )) that deliver Ulevel sets that are subsets of a contiguous union.
1 0 The notation P[Vn sjz; Fz] serves to remind that Vn is an order statistic of valuations which are identically and independently distributed with conditional distribution function Fz.
1 1 See Section 2.3 in David and Nagaraja (2003) . The density function of this Beta random variable is proportional to u n 1 (1 u) M n .
The highest bid stochastically dominates the second highest valuation
With y 00 M = v and y 0 = ( 1; 1; : : : ; 1) the containment functional probability (8) is:
so, with this choice of (y 0 ; y 00 M ), the condition (5) delivers the following inequalities.
These inequalities hold for a valuation distribution function F z if and only if under that distribution the second highest valuation is stochastically dominated by the highest bid as required by the restriction (2).
All valuation distribution functions in the identi…ed set must satisfy:
which is (10) rewritten in terms of a uniform order statistic, equivalently 12 8v :
1 2 There is another expression:
and the following inequalities.
8s :
This is the bound given in Theorem 2 of HT when the minimum bid increment considered there is set equal to zero. 13 Figure 8 shows, outlined in blue, the contiguous unions of U -level sets delivering this inequality. The shaded region indicates the values of (F z (y 2 ); F z (y 1 )) that deliver U -level sets that are subsets of this contiguous union.
Contiguous unions depending on a single value of y
In the two cases just considered contiguous unions of U -level sets are determined by (y 0 ; y 00 M ) in which a single value, v, of Y appears. The inequalities they deliver place a continuum of pointwise upper and lower bounds on the value of the valuation distribution function, F z (v), at a value v. When Y is continuously distributed these are the only contiguous unions determined by a single value that deliver nontrivial inequalities.
Bids continuously distributed
To see that this is so, …rst suppose that y 00 M takes some …nite value v as in Section 5.2. We must have y 0 M < v otherwise the containment functional is zero if Y is continuously distributed. The only possible value for y 0 M that does not introduce a second …nite value is 1 and since y 0 m y 0 M for all M we arrive at the case considered in Section 5.2. Now suppose a single …nite value v determines the vector y 0 . The only feasible value for y 00 M is +1 because we must have y 00 M > y 0 M to obtain a nontrivial inequality with Y continuously distributed. Since the elements of y 0 must be ordered we arrive at the case considered in Section 5.1. With n = M there is 14
Bids not continuously distributed
and the condition (5) delivers the following inequalities. 1 4 The expression for GU (U(y 0 ; y 00 M ; z; h)) is obtained as:
which delivers the result as stated.
Contiguous unions depending on two values of y
The bounds (9) and (11) The containment functional probability (8) is
# which, plugged into (5) delivers inequalities which must be satis…ed by all valuation distribution functions in the identi…ed set for all n 2 < n 1 M and all v 1 v 2 .
As an example, the inequalities obtained with n 1 = M and n 2 = M 1 for which y 0 = ( 1; : : : ; 1; v 2 ; v 1 ) are as follows.
These inequalities must be satis…ed by all valuation distribution functions F z in the identi…ed set.
Case 2
In this case: y 00 M = v 1 and, with v 1 > v 2 , y 0 = ( 1; : : : ; 1; v 2 |{z} position n ; : : : ; v 2 ):
The containment functional probability (8) is
# which, plugged into (5) delivers inequalities which must be satis…ed by all valuation distribution functions in the identi…ed set for all n M and all v 1 > v 2 . As an example, the inequalities obtained with n = M 1 are as follows.
8v 1 > v 2 :
Discussion
The inequalities presented in this Section, of which (13) and (14) are examples, may not be satis…ed by all valuation distributions which satisfy the HT bounds (9) and (11) In Figure 10 two valuation values are selected, v 1 = 14 and v 2 = 5 and the upper and lower bounds on F z (v) are marked by black circles at these two values. Figure 11 shows a unit square within which we can plot possible values of ( F z (14); F z (5)). In this Figure In Example 2 the valuation distribution function is a mixture of normal distributions. This is drawn in red in Figure 12 with bounds drawn in blue. Figure 13 shows two selected valuation values, v 1 = 12:5 and v 2 = 11:5. The blue rectangle in Figure 14 shows the pointwise bounds on the ordinates ( F z (12:5); F z (11:5)) which must lie above the orange 45 line since the survivor function is decreasing. The new bounds (13) and (14) where and 2 are the mean and variance of log valuations. Identi…ed sets for ( ; ) are calculated using a probability distribution of ordered bids obtained under the bidding mechanism employed in Example 1 in Section 6 as described in Annex A, but with the probability distribution of valuations simply lognormal, LN (0; 1) rather than mixed lognormal as is used in the calculations reported in Section 6.
The probabilities on the right hand sides of inequalities (9), (11), (13) and (14) are calculated from 10 8 simulated two bidder auctions.
The sharp identi…ed set for is de…ned by an uncountable in…nity of inequalities. We employ a …nite number chosen as follows. A sequence of values of valuations V fv 1 ; : : : ; v N g is generated as a standard lognormal, LN (0; 1), quantile function applied to N values f 1 N +1 ; 2 N +1 ; : : : ; N N +1 g. For a candidate value of the two pointwise inequalities (9) and (11) are calculated at these N values and the new two-coordinate inequalities (14) and (13) are
We also consider three-coordinate inequalities obtained using contiguous unions with y 00 M = v 1 and, with v 1 v 2 v 3 , y 0 = ( 1; : : : ; 1; v 3 ; v 2 ):
The containment functional probability (8) for these test sets is
which is as follows.
These three-coordinate inequalities are calculated for each triple
We compare outer regions of the identi…ed set for obtained using (i) the pointwise bounds of HT, (ii) the pointwise and two-coordinate bounds and (iii) the pointwise, two-coordinate and three-coordinate bounds. Calculations were done using a 100 100 grid of values of ( ; ). (13) and (14), and 2300 three-coordinate inequalities. 15
The region colored blue is the set of values of ( ; ) obtained using all inequalities if these were considered alone. Table 1 shows the projections of the sets for individual parameters, and , and identi…ed intervals for various measures of the location of the distribution of valuations. Values that change on considering the two-and three-coordinate inequalities in addition to the pointwise bounds are set out in bold font.
The approximate identi…ed sets for the optimal reserve price and the maximal pro…t under three values of marginal cost are shown in Table 2 .
The bounds on the optimal reserve price are wide -this echoes the result found in HT. The new two-coordinate inequalities reduce the bounds but not to a great extent. There is some slight further reduction on additionally 8 Concluding remarks The approach adopted in HT to determining sharpness is a constructive one, e¤ectively searching for admissible bidding strategies which deliver the distribution of …nal bids used to calculate the bounds for every distribution of valuations in a proposed identi…ed set. As noted in HT 18 this is di¢ cult to carry through in the auction model. Constructive proofs of sharpness have the advantage that they deliver at least one of the many complete, observationally equivalent, speci…cations of the process under study. However they are frequently hard to obtain. The method set out in CR and applied here has the advantage that sharpness is guaranteed.
Gentry and Li (2014) take a constructive approach to proof of sharpness of identi…ed sets in a model of auctions with selective entry. They produce pointwise bounds on the value of a distribution function of valuations at each value of its argument and prove pointwise sharpness. Taking the approach 1 6 A selection of a random set is a random variable that lies in the random set with probability one. A probability distribution is selectionable with respect to a random set if there exists a selection of the random set which has that probability distribution. The probabilities used in the two examples in Section 6 were produced by simulation using 10 7 independent draws of identically distributed independent pairs of valuations from a valuation distribution and a fully speci…ed stochastic mechanism that delivers …nal bids given valuations. Distribution functions of ordered bids and the various probabilities that appear in bounds are simply calculated as proportions of simulated ordered bids that meet the required conditions. In the two examples valuations have di¤erent distributions and bids are obtained from valuations in di¤erent ways.
In Example 1 the valuation distribution is speci…ed as a mixture of two log normal distributions, one LN (0; 1) and the other LN (2:5; 0:5 2 ) with mixture weights respectively 0:3 and 0:7. 19 In each of the 10 The U -level set U((y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ); z; h) containing values of uniform order statistics, u 2 u 1 , that can give rise to order statistics of bids, (y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ). F z is the distribution function of valuations. As labelled this is for the 2 bidder case. In the M bidder case this shows a projection of a level set with u 2 (u 1 ) denoting the largest (second largest) order statistic of M i.i.d. uniform variates. Figure 2 : In blue the U -level set U((y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ); z; h) containing values of uniform order statistics, u 2 u 1 , that can give rise to order statistics of bids, (y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ). F z is the distribution function of valuations. In magenta the U -level set obtained as y 0 2 is reduced as shown by the arrow. This is never a subset of the original U -level set outlined in blue. As labelled this is for the 2 bidder case. Figure 3 : In blue the U -level set U((y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ); z; h) containing values of uniform order statistics, u 2 u 1 , that can give rise to order statistics of bids, (y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ). F z is the distribution function of valuations. In magenta the U -level set obtained as y 0 2 is increased as shown by the arrow. This is never a subset of the original U -level set outlined in blue. As labelled this is for the 2 bidder case. Figure 4 : In blue the U -level set U((y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ); z; h) containing values of uniform order statistics, u 2 u 1 , that can give rise to order statistics of bids, (y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ). F z is the distribution function of valuations. In magenta the U -level set obtained as y 0 1 is increased as shown by the arrow. This is always a subset of the original U -level set. As labelled this is for the 2 bidder case. Figure 5 : 2 bidder case. The contiguous union of level sets: U(y 0 ; y 00 2 ; z; h) where y 0 = (y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ), y 0 2 and y 00 2 are values taken by the maximal order statistic of bids, Y 2 , and y 0 1 is a value taken by the second largest order statistic of bids, Y 1 . In the labels, F z is the distribution function of valuations. The shaded area indicates the values of Y that give a U -level set which is a subset of the contiguous union. Figure 6 : 2 bidder case. The triangular region outlined in blue is the contiguous union of level sets: U(y 0 ; y 00 2 ; z; h) where y 0 1 = y 0 2 = v and y 00 2 = 1. F z is the distribution function of valuations. This choice of y 0 and y 00 2 delivers the inequality requiring the second highest valuation to stochastically dominate the second highest bid. The shaded area indicates the values of Y that give a U -level set which is a subset of the contiguous union. Figure 7 : 2 bidder case. The trapezoidal region outlined in blue is the contiguous union of level sets: U(y 0 ; y 00 2 ; z; h) where y 0 = ( 1; v) and y 00 2 = 1. F z is the distribution function of valuations. This choice of y 0 and y 00 2 delivers the inequality requiring the highest valuation stochastically dominates the highest bid. The shaded area indicates the values of Y that give a U -level set which is a subset of the contiguous union. Figure 8 : 2 bidder case. The trapezoidal region outlined in blue is the contiguous union of level sets: U(y 0 ; y 00 2 ; z; h) where y 0 = ( 1; 1) and y 00 2 = v. F z is the distribution function of valuations. This choice of y 0 and y 00 2 delivers the inequality requiring the highest bid stochastically dominates the second highest valuation. The shaded area indicates the values of Y that give a U -level set which is a subset of the contiguous union. Figure 11 : Example 1. The blue rectangle shows upper and lower bounds on F z (v 1 ) and F z (v 2 ) at v 1 = 14 and v 2 = 5. These ordinates of the valuation survivor function must lie above the 45 line (orange). The new bounds require they lie above the magenta and red lines as well. Only the red line delivered by inequality 14 is binding. Figure 14 : Example 2. The blue rectangle shows upper and lower bounds on F z (v 1 ) and F z (v 2 ) at v 1 = 12:5 and v 2 = 11.5. These ordinates of the valuation survivor function must lie above the 45 line (orange). The new bounds (13) and (14) Figure 15 : Outer regions for lognormal valuation distribution parameters and (mean and standard deviation of log valuations). The union of the two …lled regions (blue and pink) is the identi…ed set obtained using the HT pointwise upper and lower bounds. The lower pink region is excluded by the inequalities (13) and (14) and the upper pink region is excluded by new inequalities involving three values of V . This leaves just the …lled blue region as the approximate identi…ed set. The green dot marks the value of ( ; ) used to generate the probability distribution of valuations employed in this example. 
